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The Limits of Judicial Creativity*
By ROGER J.

TRAYNOR*

Once upon a time, as new towers of power displaced windmills,
economists rejoiced in the growth and development of the landscape
and scientists waxed confident of displacing magicians in the creation
of new wonders. Lawyers, however, buried their heads as before
in the casebooks, in a perennial search for appropriate magic words
to unravel the legal entanglements of man. Recurringly they also
rooted out magic words for women and children who bore a properly
beautiful relationship to man, as by marriage or descent, that could
be conventionally expounded with doting care and many a dotty
maxim. Over a long age, for example, the law made it clear to any
woman entering marriage that now the twain were one, and then
made it clearer that she was not the one. In the main, decisions in
the courthouse were the dominant ground rules of legal relations.
Once upon a time.
By the time I became a judge in 1940, there were abundant signs
that though the courthouse still had the last word in case or controversy, the legislatures were formulating steadily more of the daily
ground rules. What the legislators lacked in skill, they made up for
in volume. In every state and countless cities and villages, as well
as inthe Potomac fever wards of Washington, D.C., statutes emerged
from the hoppers with never a break. Only very recently have we
begun to ask sunrise and sunset questions: Why should a statute
rise? How good does it look by dusk?
In this heyday of mass-produced laws, I finally came to a spaceage vision of them as "Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits."'
A judge was bound to learn that the modest premises of the common
*
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law would have to sprout a few wings to keep pace with the astronomical consequences of all those statutes revolving wildly in the
same orbits as sedately-paced judicial decisions.
For better or worse, legislatures have responded to real or
imagined needs as courts could not. Given the massive number of
statutes that are breeding grounds for controversy, courts have had
an increasingly heavy task of interpreting statutes, or adjudging their
constitutionality, or resolving conflicts of law to avert collision and
preserve harmonious relations among states, and between states and
the federal government. From such a context emerges the tripartite
theme of this inquiry into the limits of judicial creativity:
(1) Even though judicial decisions have been superseded by
statutes as the primary source of law, a judge has a greatly expanded
role as the final interpreter of the law.
(2) As an interpreter, whether of judicial precedent or statutory law, he 2 is necessarily an active analyst and not a passive oracle.
An actively analytical judge bears no relation to that ill-defined character, the so-called judicial activist.
(3) Even at his most active, he must be alert to set limits on
judicial creativity sufficient to preserve the distance between judicial
analysis and legislative innovation.
There is now growing awareness that legislators, not judges, are
writing most of the rulebooks. In the context of this legislative ascendancy, one must take account of a double paradox. First a judge's
jobsite, seemingly so decorous, affords far from tidy working conditions. Ordinarily what passes before judges on the reviewing stand
is not a well-programmed, orderly parade, but fragments from a circus
on the loose, collared by anxious barkers for a motley procession
across the line of vision that defies the viewing judges to guess at all
that has escaped notice and to foresee what may still appear. Nonetheless a determined judge can impose order on such chaotic scenes
by searching out from a clutter of detail the significant elements for
reasoned evaluation.
The second paradox is that a legislature in the main operates
amid tumult and too often without adequate study, even though it
has the advantage of relatively splendid working conditions for rational lawmaking. A legislature can respond readily to an urgent
2. The masculine form used throughout the text as a space-saver carries a shorthand reference to both man and woman.
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problem, tailoring specifications to meet the need. It can call upon
scholarly help, and often it has recourse to research staffs of its own.
It can draft in haste and still revise at leisure. It can erase one slate
clean and mark up another, without regard for precedent. It can
do advance work in trouble-prone areas with a view to comprehensive legislation. Its only disadvantage, though not a fatal one for
courageous legislators reinforced by courageous journalists, is its vulnerability to political pressures, to the whims and whammies of socalled elitist groups or so-called oppressed groups or a so-called vox
populi.
In either the judicial or the legislative domain, luck plays a part.
Once, for example, three cases came before my court in tidy sequence
instead of the usual random ramble. They afforded the court an
ideal opportunity to re-examine the purported rules, long entrenched
by early misconceptions of the law, that permitted forfeiture of a
defaulting vendee's interest under a contract for the conditional sale
of land. The decisions in the first two cases, Barkis v. Scott3 and
Baffa v. Johnson,4 established that the vendee's interest could not be
forfeited if his breach was neither wilful nor negligent. The third
case, Freedman v. Rector,5 advanced upon this text with a decision
that forfeiture even for a vendee's wilful breach would be denied
when it was clear that such forfeiture would give the vendor more
than fair compensation for whatever injury he had sustained. By
thus articulating a new principle in three instalments, the court dislodged unsound precedents with a minimum of shock.
Comparable luck is regularly at hand for legislators. The stateby-state adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code ensued from
years of scholarly work sponsored by the American Law Institute and
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. There is no dearth of
other such riches. All too often, however, these sources remain neglected wasting assets, one of the most grievous wastes in our profligate
country. Once we perceive that an appellate court does not review
statutory law except by chance, when litigation arises, we then can
understand how urgent it is that every legislature rationalize its mass
production of laws by making full use of the assets at its disposal.
Law reviews and daily journals have a corresponding obligation to
keep watch that a legislature does so. Wherever situated, from
Congress to village councils, legislators should take the initiative to
3. 34 Cal. 2d 116, 123, 208 P.2d 367, 372 (1949).
4. 35 Cal. 2d 36, 39, 216 P.2d 13, 14 (1950).
5.

37 Cal. 8d 16, 22, 230 P.2d 629, 632 (1951).
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establish lines of communication with the many associations, law
centers, and scholars at work on legislative problems. Within each
state, the natural agency for such communication is a law revision
commission with ready access to appropriate legislative committees,
so that carefully documented studies and proposals can receive timely legislative consideration. A state that muddles along without such
a commission needlessly muddles along on candlelight when electricity is readily available.
A legal center operating within the purview of a law school affords an ideal environment for such a commission. There a commission could devote itself, free from political pressures, to the drafting of needed statutes. It could constantly review existing statutes
detecting those that become aimless scarecrows for no more than
the befuddlement of harried citizens. It could sound timely alerts
for sunrise or sunset laws. It could evaluate competing requests for
public expenditures. It could hasten the day of rational public budgets and readily available public accounts. It could trace the tortuous
streams of federal funds into the various states and the equally tortuous streams of federal and state funds into local communities.
It could compile a true detective story on who determines the flow
of the funds from the source, who receives the funds and then channels them, and who does the basic accounting. There could be a
key chapter on the qualifications and whereabouts of independent
auditors, if any. Along with these studies of public expenditures,
the lifestream of most legislation, there could be corresponding studies
of taxes, the sources of the stream.
Given such rational reinforcements, many an otherwise indifferent or timid legislator might improve the tenor of his own communications with his constituents. In today's climate the public seems
not only ready but eager for improvements in the legislative process.
There are even signs that some journalists also stand ready to reexamine their own responsibilities, their noblesse oblige in the fourth
estate to upgrade the daily journalistic intake of its readers.
One can hardly imagine anything more beneficial to the law
than permanent lines of communication between those entrusted to
review laws critically and those entrusted to legislate. The longrange studies of scholars can richly complement the applied research
that legislators recurringly ask of their legislative aides. In turn, the
work of a law revision commission within a legal center would offer
hearty sustenance not only to a law review but to many other projects
of a law school, not the least of which is the classroom.
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Pending the millenium, however, we must resign ourselves to
the antic ways of legislators. Now and then they are very good indeed, thanks to a talented draftsman among them and their own
good will to work. Now and then they are very good by chance,
approving a well-drafted bill, for extraneous reasons, that they have
not troubled to read. Too often they legislate madly, confounding
the confusions of one paragraph with several more to explain what
the first paragraph is deemed to mean if read alone, if read in conjunction with two others, or if read pursuant to the famous Welsh
treatise on the active and inert elements of a homeless verb.
Recurringly legislators abstain from any action, moving ingeniously their wonders not to perform. When they abdicate responsibility for clarifying the controversial language of their own statutes,
in effect they relegate the task to the courts. It is worse still when
legislators appear not to see or hear a problem that clamors for legislative attention, mystifying others by their silence. Even so modest a
proposal as that of the American Law Institute some six years ago
for a rational allocation of jurisdiction between state and federal
courts still awaits congressional action.
When legislators fail to confront such salient legislative problems
as reapportionment or school desegregation, partisans then make their
way to the courthouse for a judicial pronouncement. This .recourse
to a less appropriate forum is a makeshift solution. Via this circuitous route, the eventual judicial decision compels legislators to confront the problem they sought to avoid. At best they can do so
without great to-do. Sometimes, however, a judicial decision quickens the long taciturn legislators into a hullabaloo of lawmaking, with
the usual risks attendant upon feverish activity.
Some years ago, for example, the legislature in California had
ample warning that common-law precedents on sovereign immunity
had worn thin and that the consequent problems had become so
massive as to clearly signify a need for comprehensive legislation.
The legislature looked away and said nothing. The problem then
came to a head in the Muskoph v. Corning Hospital District6 decision
that repudiated sovereign immunity. Only then did the legislature
bestir itself to spell out long-needed statutory law.
In the area of sovereign immunity, the legislature should have
known, from the hours successively striking, that the zero hour was
coming. The doctrine of sovereign immunity had become so riddled
6.

55 Cal. 2d 211, 221, 359 P.2d 457, 463, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 95 (1961).
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with exceptions that its terminal illness was apparent. The warnings
are not always so clear, however. Their varying intensity serves to
illustrate anew that everything in the law is a matter of degree.
The subtleties of degree are particularly significant in an age when
so much lawmaking is preoccupied with social reform. Thus, constitutional lawyers will be pondering for years to come the implications
of the recent decisions in Serrano v. Priest,7 which imposed upon the
legislature the formidable task of instituting a new system of financing
public schools throughout the state. Whatever the merits of a ruling
in a state court that turns on the interpretation of the equal protection clause of a state constitution, the fact remains that resolution
of the controversy through the judicial route impels a legislature to
shorten drastically the time it might normally take to enact comprehensive long-range statutes in the complex field of taxation.
On cases of such dimension, students of constitutional law will
find valid grounds for difference as to how readily a court should
arrive at a constitutional rule that nudges a legislature into social
reform along one expansive front or another, such as schooling, housing, health, or transportation. Nevertheless there remains widespread
agreement that the court itself cannot be the engine of social reform.
The very responsibilities of a judge as an arbiter disqualify him as
a crusader.
It is no contradiction to say, however, that the responsibilities
of a judge do compel him to bring an actively analytical mind to his
work. At this juncture I reiterate my early warning that an active
mind is not to be confused with the misbegotten catch phrase, judicial activism, as it has too frequently been confused by the slovenly
of speech.
It is important to remember that by the time a case reaches an
appellate court there are certainly two sides to the question, and at
times maybe three or more. There is no way an appellate judge
can find an easy answer to the hard question before him, no way he
7. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 614, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 610 (1971)
(Serrano 1); 18 Cal. 3d 728, 769, 557 P.2d 929, 953, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 369 (1976)
(Serrano II), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2951 (1977).
(In Serrano I the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded a trial court decision on the stipulation that if the
plaintiff's allegations were sustained, the state public school financing system must be
held unconstitutional. The trial court's decision, which applied the "strict scrutiny"
test and found that the state had failed to establish that the classification in question
was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, was subsequently affirmed in
Serrano II). The Serrano problem remains open to so many variations and ramifications that it is still far from being definitively resolved.
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can spare his mind from thinking, no way he can abstain from writing
an opinion in some measure original. At the same time he must
remain the watchful keeper of the continuity scripts, entrusted to
make the paragraph transitions from one case to another in the same
area, to explain any amplification or updating of a familiar text, to
justify in detail any departure therefrom, to elucidate the principles
underlying the solution of a problem without true precedent. Ideally, he should be able to state his reasons plainly enough to enlighten
counsel as to why they won or lost, and to allay the suspicions of
any man in the street who regards knowledge of the law as no excuse
for making it.
Moreover, in his preoccupation with any given script, for example the continuity script in Contracts, the judge must visualize it
in the context of others. The quarrel over a contract to build a tunnel through Sunnyhills must be analyzed in terms of the appropriate
chapter in Contracts; but it may also have to be analyzed with reference to Torts or Equity or Conflict of Laws, or a host of new statutes on land use or environmental controls.
Given the hodgepodge appearance of cases, entirely dependent
on the chance of who undertakes to litigate what, it is no easy task
to ensure a continuity script that will not look like a crazy quilt.
The printouts of a stare decisis computer, as we might define a routine judge, would result in such a crazy quilt. The sociological
tracts of a crusading judge for liberte, egalitg, fraternite, et al., would
likewise 'result in a crazy quilt. Nothing stands against lunacy in
the law but the reasoning judge, taking heart from Pascal's observation that though man is the frailest reed in nature, he is a thinking
reed.
The reasoning judge makes haste slowly. Unlike the legislator,
whose lawmaking knows no bounds, the judge stays close to his
house of the law. He invariably takes precedent as his starting point;
he is constrained to arrive at a decision in the context of ancestral
judicial experience: the given decisions, or lacking these, the given
dicta, or lacking these, the given clues. Even if his search of the
past yields nothing, so that he confronts a truly unprecedented case,
he still arrives at a decision in the context of judicial reasoning with
recognizable ties to the past; by its kinship thereto it not only establishes the unprecedented case as a precedent for the future, but
integrates it in the often rewovei but always unbroken line with the
past. The greatest judges of the common law have proceeded in
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this way, moving not by fits and starts, but at the pace of the tortoise
that steadily advances though it carries the past on its back.
A reasoning judge's painstaking exploration of place and his
sense of pace give reassurance that when he takes an occasional dramatic leap forward he is impelled to do so in the very interest of
orderly progression. When he has encountered endless chaos in his
long march on a given track, the most cautious thing he can do is
to take a new turn. He does so though he knows that ours is a profession that prides itself on not throwing chaos lightly to the winds.
Now and again a legal problem surfaces that defies definitive
solution, particularly in a time of rapid change. There are few clues
in the rusting wheels of Winterbottom v. Wright" as to how we should
deal with novel problems of vehicles in outer space. There are few
clues in Blackacre or Sunnyhills for resolving future squabbles among
the good buddies in Galaxy Hollow. When there is no help from
the past, a judge can do no more than seek what Cardozo has called
the least erroneous answer to an insoluble problem. Nevertheless,
a searching error is a useful worm, burrowing deep to leaven the
hard ground of tradition that it may nourish new growth as dogma
dies.
The very caution of the judicial process offers the best of reasons
for confidence in the recurring reformation of judicial rules. A decision that has not suffered premature birth has a reduced risk of
premature death. Insofar as a court remains uncommitted to unduly wide implications of a decision, it gains time to inform itself
further through succeeding cases. It is then better situated to retreat or advance with little disturbance to the evolutionary course
of the law and to those who act in reliance upon judicial decisions.
After a generation of experience, I believe that the primary obligation of a judge, at once conservative and creative, is to keep the
inevitable evolution of the law on a rational course. Twenty years
ago I wrote that the danger was not that judges would exceed their
power, but that they would fall short of their obligation.
Better
the active pilot, sensitive to the currents of the river, than an armchair captain hidebound to a dated rulebook. The pilot who knows
the river, however, must above all know the moorings well. If he
8. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
9. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U.
CHI. L. REv. 211, 244 (1957).
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disengages his bark from one, he must be certain he can reach
another.
So constant a responsibility, involving such active thought, resists inclusion within so befuddled a term as activism. Given reason
and not merely the rulebook as the soul of law, I would also voice
a cautionary note that the reasoning judge, the pilot on the qui vive,
is not one indifferent to rulebooks. He takes care to keep them upto-date, reading more than ever to do so, with a critical eye for
words that wear poorly and a discriminating sense for those that wear
well. If he is on guard against mechanical incantations of obsolescent rules in the name of ancestral loyalty, he is also on guard against
mechanical rejections of sturdy rules in the name of social justice.
The complacent captain in the armchair is not more of a danger than
the pilot who would navigate with a clenched fist in the air instead
of at the helm.
In sum, the thinking judge might reexamine the rules that had
been preserving the status quo of Marie Antoinette, but he would
not join those who would repudiate the spirit of the law so that they
could proceed to behead her.
One would think this judicial view would be taken for granted
in the legal profession, perhaps even in the community. There is
little ground, however, for such optimism. In highly literate nations,
as in primitive societies, the voices of those who speak only reason
are frequently lost amid the cacophonies, all uttered in the name of
the law, of the zealous defenders of the so-called status quo and the
zealous advocates of so-called social justice. Among the defenders
there are even a few lawyers who still believe that it is for a judge
to state, restate, occasionally expand, or even contort established
precedents, but that he cannot properly create a new one. The blunt
fact remains that every precedent once had to be created by a judge
for a then unprecedented case. The argument then goes that innovation today rests with the legislators by virtue of their unique sensitivity to public moods, or what is sometimes called an ear to the
ground. The trouble with this view is that we certainly cannot afford now, if we ever could, to play the law entirely by ear. There
are a number of objections to such improvisation. The most obvious
is that one who relies on the ear without attendant reflection offers
no assurance of sensitive hearing. In the din of a largely urban society, he may hear the bellowing of militant groups or the siren
songs of sophisticated special pleaders, but not the murmurs of other
individuals. He may be quick with a generous dispensation of pub-
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lie funds to groups for ostensibly worthy projects, so long as such
dispensation attracts little public notice. He is given to assessing
the effect of a given action upon his chances for re-election. His will
for lawmaking is a will of many wisps. It is the exceptional legislator who is guided by fiat lux rather than the murky light of ignis
fatuus.
We have all too few watchdogs of the legislative process to report not only when legislators legislate to no good purpose, but also
when they abdicate their responsibility to deal with controversial
issues. Legislators have become astute at turning away from highly
visible issues on which they do not wish to gamble their political
lives. The final irony is that when they thus fail not only the old
guard that would trust them with all innovation, but also the zealots
of controversial causes, the latter then turn to the courthouse.
Though they often fail to obtain a hearing for an inappropriate cause
in that forum, their efforts prompt warnings of judicial activism from
the very people who fail to decry legislative inaction.
In so confusing a scene, few people recognize that indiscriminate
pleas for judicial hearings, and an occasional indiscriminate grant
of one, are abnormalities in the courthouse. A judge is constrained
by training, experience, and the office itself, not to undertake responsibilities that belong to the legislature.
In his quite different responsibility of assuring the rational continuity of the law, a judge may now and again be compelled by
reason to arrive at an innovative decision, in the honorable tradition
of ancestral precedent-setters. Such a decision exemplifies judicial
responsibility at its most challenging. The innovative decision is
the most difficult for a judge to elucidate, for it usually concerns a
controversy that has compelled him to evaluate conflicting interests
in terms of a changing social or economic context. He is himself
in the moving picture of that change, but must somehow view it dispassionately. That perspective he can achieve only by a long look
at the past, in terms of the present, to evaluate whether once useful
precedents are impaired by obsolescence, or whether there are no
useful precedents, and then by a long look at the present in terms
of the future, to evaluate what the long-range prospects of currently
visible change are.
This generation has witnessed innovative precedents, reflecting
a rapidly changing world, on such matters as products liability, charitable and sovereign immunity, fiduciary obligations in various con-
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texts, new intrafamily obligations, new concepts of land ownership
and use, and a variety of questions under the Bill of Rights and the
fourteenth amendment.
A judge must elucidate painstakingly a decision that involves
the overruling of an earlier one. He soon learns that a bad precedent is easier said than undone. If the discarded precedent was
intrinsically unsound from the outset, he must undertake an exposition of the injustice of confusion it engendered. When he thus
speaks out, his words may serve also to quicken public respect for
the law as an instrument of justice. If the discarded decision has
merely become obsolete, he must also specify how it fails to mesh
with contemporary laws or with other judicial rules or statutes.
Again, a judge can quicken public respect for the law by his own
care to keep it free of trappings that no longer serve any useful
purpose.
The constant repair and renewal that ensures the sturdy continuity of the common law involves significant judicial creativity in
such overruling of ill-conceived, moribund, or obsolete precedents.
It is easy enough to perceive the usefulness of such creativity, but
we must be on guard against supposing that we have thus neatly
encompassed all that is involved in the process of overruling. In
this regard, as in any other area of the law, one must beware the
simplifier who comes bearing nutshells. Students in law schools are
frequently cautioned to think about the alternatives as a lawyer
would; now and again they should also think about the complexities
as a judge should. When your first roadblock as a judge is a bad
precedent, you thereafter confront a second, the retroactive consequences of an overruling decision. The prospect of a consequent
hardship to one party or another, though not invariable, has in the
past inclined some judges to let bad enough alone. Then came the
technique of prospective overruling, which enables a judge to halt
a bad precedent, but only at the threshold of the future, so that there
will be no violence to the reasonable expectations of those who had
relied upon that precedent. The technique is as serviceable as it
is imaginative in certain areas, such as property and contracts, where
reasonable expectations are the dominant rules of the game. The
buyer of a home or the contractor who builds one can reasonably
expect that the rules will not be changed without fair warning. Likewise, prospective overruling has a place in the area of expanding
criminal liability. One who has long tended a smokestack with im-
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punity, for example, might reasonably expect that a court newly attuned to consequent hazards for others would make a new punitive
ruling prospective only.
Lest it be thought that the problem of overruling can now rattle
comfortably in the nutshell called "prospective," one should consider
still more complications. Tort cases, for example, do not fit that
small mold, for neither the tortfeasor nor the victim nurses any reasonable expectations about injury that has yet to occur. When everyone's daily life is prone to risk, it is hardly realistic to suppose that
people are assiduously studying current rules of liability so that they
may set out to hit or be hit advantageously.
Absent any reasonable reliance of the parties on current rules,
why should courts that expand or contract rules of tort liability resort to prospective overruling only? What rational justification is
there for distinguishing between tort victims before and after an
overruling decision? As a corollary, what rational justification is
there in a prospective overruling that would end a sovereign or
charitable immunity henceforth, but not in the instant case.
We must ask these questions of an outstandingly good judicial
process because, like the good workhorse, it can suffer greatly for
want of a nail. The issue of retroactivity has been decided at times
in both the United States Supreme Court and the state courts with
needless arbitrariness. We can hardly rest content with such guidelines as the United States Supreme Court has delineated for resolving
the issue of retroactivity in criminal cases. 10 Rapid readers or uncritical slow ones should scrutinize those lilting guidelines, namely:
the purpose of the new rule; the extent of reliance by law-enforcement agencies on the old standards; and finally, the effect on the
administration of justice. None of these guidelines clearly encompasses a consideration of the hardship or inequity suffered by those
who are denied the benefit of the new rule and compelled to bear
the burden of what is now recognized as an unjust rule. That consideration, particularly if imprisonment or death is at stake, weighs
heavily against the reliance of law-enforcement agencies or any increased burden on the administration of justice that might result
from equal treatment of all those equally situated.
A critic who finds that a horse is limping along for want of adequate nails has some responsibility to provide them. The basic
10. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297-99 (1967); Tehan v. United States ex rel
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 419 (1966).
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guidelines I envisage for prospective overruling would compel analysis within straight and narrow channels, namely: First, there must
be a marshalling of the reasons why a precedent should be overruled; and second, there must be a reasoned demonstration that the
hardship on a party who has relied on the old rule outweighs the
hardship on the party denied the benefits of the new rule." However simply stated, such guidelines are not for the fainthearted. A
judge must do more than decree; he must reason every inch of the
way.
The technique of prospective overruling offers an apt example
of how a judge can be creative for better or for worse. It is an admirable technique if attended by rigorous guidelines for the rational
evolution of the law. Ineptly or indiscriminately used, however, it
is open to abuse by zealous advocates casting for new rules that escape rigorous analysis. A judge must be on guard against invoking
it carelessly to lend spurious grace to a departure from the old rule
without painstaking explanation. When he takes on such facile
grace, the judge loses his- unique quality, the plodding tenacity that
enables him to puzzle out where to place markers that will afford
enduring guidance for others. Before undertaking a dramatic leap
forward, when it becomes clear that prospectivity will be an issue,
he should wait until the litigants have had an opportunity to be heard
on the issue via briefs and perhaps oral argument. By thus insuring
that a decision on prospectivity will not have to await another case,
a judge precludes the uncertainty that would otherwise bedevil counsel
and other courts in the interim.
To say that a judge must plod rather than soar is not to call him
pedestrian. It takes vision to recognize the junctures where markers
can best help those who travel the long trails of the law. Such vision
is essential in the occasional cases where a judge must choose between
conflicting lines of precedent or, in an unprecedented case, between
conflicting lines of policy. How now, brown cow, when here comes
a white one?
In such cases, we should not be misled by the half-truth that
policy is a matter for the legislators alone to decide. The word
"policy" has one connotation in the legislature and another in court.
Legislators can embark on any policy at will, whether vise or expedient or artful, without regard either for the continuity scripts of
11. See Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533 (1977).
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the law or for the coherence of their own ticker tapes. A judge, in
contrast, cannot speak unless he is spoken to, and he must mind his
musing when he does so. There is always an area not covered by
legislation in which judges must revise old rules or create new ones,
and in that process policy may be an appropriate and even a basic
consideration. The briefs carry the first responsibility in stating the
policy at stake and demonstrating its relevance; but if they fail or
fall short in this task, no conscientious judge will set bounds to his
inquiry. If he finds no significant clues in the law reports or statutes of his own or other jurisdictions, he will not close his eyes to a
pertinent study merely because it was written by an economist or
perhaps an anthropologist or an engineer.
Why should judges not inquire, the better to resolve a hard
case, into what Kenneth Davis calls the "legislative facts"12 or what
we might call the environmental data, as distinguished from selected
litigated facts about the parties presented with partisan fortissimos
and pianissimos? When hard cases make good law, is it not usually
because the judges had before them the data requisite for informed
judgment? Is it not just as foolish in the judicial process as anywhere else to resolve problems of enormous factual complexity without adequate data? The alternative is to assume the risk of dubious
a priori assumptions. The common law is replete with such assumptions, as for example, the assumptions in the law of evidence that
an innocent person is more likely to deny an accusatory statement
than a guilty one and that an admission against one's property interests is probably true whereas an admission against one's penal
interest is not.
Though only a small fraction of cases are of a complexity that
calls for inquiry beyond the facts about the parties and available
precedents, those cases may be of major significance in the development of the law. Yet the courts all too rarely have the benefit in
such cases of Brandeis briefs comparable to the original. There are
all too few law reviewers scrutinizing the work of either legislators
or lawyers as they scrutinize that of judges; were they to do so, they
might turn up some eye-opening material like the pioneer eye-opening
brief that devastated, with overwhelming environmental data, the a
priori assumptions of a century.
We need not distrust judicial scrutiny of such extralegal materials. The very independence of judges, fostered by tradition even
12.
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when not guaranteed by tenure, and their continuous adjustment of
sight to varied problems, tend to develop in the least of them some
skill in the evaluation of massive data. They learn to detect latent
quackery in medicine, to question doddered scientific findings, to
edit the swarm spore of the social scientists, and to add grains of
salt to the fortune-telling statistics of the economists. Moreover, as
with cases or legal theories not covered by the briefs, judges are
bound in fairness under our adversary system to direct the attention
of counsel to such materials, if it appears that they may affect the
outcome of the case, and to give counsel the opportunity to submit
additional briefs. So the miter square of legal analysis, the marking
blades for fitting and joining, reduce any host of materials to the gist
of a legal principle.
In sum, judicial responsibility connotes far more than the application of given rules to new sets of facts. It connotes the recurring formulation of new rules to supplement or displace the old.
It connotes the recurring choice of one policy over another in that
formulation, and an articulation of the reasons therefor.
Even so much, however, constituting the judicial contribution
to lawmaking, adds up to no more than interweaving in the reformation of law. If judges must be more than passive mechanics, they
must certainly remain much less than zealous reformers. They would
serve justice poorly by weaving samplers of law with ambitious designs for reform. judges are not equipped for such work, confined
as they are to the close work of imposing design on fragments of
litigation, bits and pieces that blow into their shop on a random wind.
As one who has declared himself against rote readings of the
law, I now voice a comparable warning against zealous incantations
that could be no less ritualistic. Applause for a judge who throws
chaos to the winds should not be interpreted as encouragement likewise to abandon caution. A judge will remain cautious if he remembers that his decisions, even though less than stone tablets, are
nonetheless resistant to easy liquidation or revision. Fortunately,
he is not likely to fancy himself raising hell as a benevolent dictator.
If he keeps his own identity in mind, neither will he risk becoming
the dictator's nearest kin, a benevolent savior with a capacity for
raising holy hell.
It is of a piece with reason that a judge envisage a decision
as one that promises to be manageable within the limited controls
of the courts, namely, specific decrees and awards of damages. If
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on rare occasion he contemplates a decision of constitutional tenor,
intended to prompt legislators to take action, he must first analyze
exhaustively the claimed urgency of such action, particularly in the
context of possibly equally strong competing claims, no one of which
might be fulfilled without cost to the others. If this hurdle is cleared,
he must still analyze whether legislators would otherwise remain delinquent toward the federal or a state constitution, despite the pleas
of their constituents. The second hurdle cleared, he must finally
analyze whether his own decision is one that the legislature can implement with justice to all and within the time prescribed.
Meanwhile, well-tempered judges will do the best they can,
within the constraints of their responsibility, to stabilize the explosive
forces of the day. They are not miracle workers, but it will be
miracle enough if they do everything within their power of reasoning to make each day in court something more than a mere day of
judgment.

